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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW/SELF-DEFENSE-Should a Defendant be
Denied the Affirmative Defense of Self-Defense if the Criminal Act was not Intentional? Self-Defense or Defense for Self?.
Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005 (Wyo. 1999).
INTRODUCTION
Self-defense and the related theory of battered woman syndrome
are Cheryl Duran's justifications for the events that led to the death of
Alfred Gutierrez. At her trial for vehicular homicide, the trial court refused to allow Duran to present a theory of defense centered on selfdefense and battered woman syndrome.' The trial court based its decision on Wyoming's requirement that vehicular homicide result from
reckless rather than intentional conduct. The Wyoming Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's decision, and one word, "intent," changed both
the course of the case and Cheryl Duran's life.
Duran, the mother of three, lived with her boyfriend, Alfred Gutierrez. On the night of January 3, 1996, Duran and Gutierrez visited
3
several drinking establishments in Cheyenne, Wyoming. At some point,
4
Gutierrez told Duran that he wanted to smoke marijuana with a friend.
Duran, upset by Gutierrez's plan, announced that she wanted to go
home.5 Gutierrez became angry when Duran started to walk home and
threw Duran into her car, causing her to hit her head on either the gearshift or the parking break lever.6 Duran managed to lock the car doors,
but Gutierrez began pulling on a partially opened window in an attempt
to forcibly enter the car.7 Duran, frightened by Gutierrez's behavior,
8
drove off with Gutierrez on the hood of the car. Duran drove east from
2

1. Duran v. State 990 P.2d 1005, 1006 (Wyo. 1999).
2. Brief of Respondent at 6, Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005 (Wyo. 1999) (No. 97302) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. Duran and Gutierrez met in May of 1995. Gutierrez lived with Duran on and off from July of 1995. Id.
Duran, 990 P.2d. at 1007.
3.
4. Respondent's Brief, supra note.2, at 7.
5. Brief of Appellant Cheryl Duran at 4, Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005 (Wyo.
1999) (No. 97-302) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
6. Id. at 4-5.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. Some discrepancy exists as to how Gutierrez got onto the hood of the car.
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the intersection of Capitol and Lincolnway Avenues at speeds ranging
from five to thirty-five miles per hour. 9 Eventually, the windshield
wiper Gutierrez was holding onto broke, and when Duran slammed on
the breaks, Gutierrez fell off of the hood of the car, suffering head injuries that resulted in his death.'
Following the incident, the trial court convicted Duran of aggravated vehicular homicide and sentenced her to a term of three to five
years in the Woman's Correctional Facility in Lusk, Wyoming." At
trial, Duran requested instructions on self-defense, but the trial court
refused the instructions because Duran s'tated that she did not intend to
injure or cause the death of Gutierrez, but rather was trying to avoid further confrontation.' 2 The trial court also denied Duran the opportunity to
present testimony on battered woman syndrome.13 The Wyoming Su-

preme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the crime committed
by Duran involved a reckless rather than an intentional act and that the

affirmative defense of self-defense was not available to Duran.14 In addition, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to5
allow Duran to present expert testimony on battered woman syndrome.'

Duran stated that she was not sure but that she did not.hit him with the car to propel him
onto the hood. Respondent's Brief, supra note 2, at 8.
Respondent's Brief, supra note 2, at 9.
9.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 6.
10.
11.
Id. at 2. Duran was charged and convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle.
Id. The applicable portion of criminal statute WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-106(b)(ii)
(LEXIS 1999) provides that a person guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years if he
operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause
of the death of another person.
Duran, 990 P.2d at 1008. Based on a life of abuse at the hands of several dif12.
ferent men, Duran feared serious injury from Gutierrez even though he had not physically abused her prior to that evening. Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 29.
Duran, 990 P.2d at 1008; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-104(a)(ix) (LEXIS 1999).
13.
Duran, 990 P.2d at 1006. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-104(a)(ix) (LEXIS 1999)
'14.
defines recklessly as the following conduct:
A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the harm he is accused of causing will occur, and the harm results.
The risk shall be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in
the situation.
Duran, 990 P.2d at 1009. Duran testified as to her history of abuse from two
15.
abusive relationships, a rape at the hands of two men, and a severe beating that left her
hospitalized for several days. Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 29. Since Gutierrez
had never struck Duran before the evening in question, she had to rely on expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome to establish her defense and, to explain that
her conduct resulted from perceived imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 30. Imminent danger is defined as "an appearance of
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The court found that Wyoming's statute allowing testimony on battered
was not relevant after the instructions on self-defense
woman syndrome
16
denied.
were
Duran v. State presented an issue of first impression in Wyoming, addressing the question of whether an affirmative defense of selfdefense is available to a defendant charged with a reckless act.' 7 The
Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision that an affirmative defense of self-defense is not available without the presence of
intentional conduct.'" Undoubtedly, Duran intended to do what was necessary to escape confrontation with Gutierrez. Thus, the problem that
arises is that if Duran had merely said that she intended to do what was
necessary to remove Gutierrez from the hood of the car, the fact scenario
changes little, but Duran would probably have been allowed to present a
defense that could have made a significant difference in the jury's decision.
The primary purpose of this case note is not to advocate Cheryl
Duran's innocence but rather to argue that the Wyoming Supreme
Court's decision creates confusion as to the applicability of the theory of
self-defense. Duran suggests that in some instances the defense may be
allowed if a person is willing to admit that she intended the resulting
injury, but in others the defense will be denied if the defendant did not
intend the specific result of her actions, even if the action and her motivation remained the same. This note also looks to the difficulty that the
jury has in answering the questions before it without a complete foundation on which to draw a conclusion based on the unique circumstances of
a particular case. This note further examines the structure of selfdefense laws with respect to abused women. In addition, this note adthreatened and impending injury as would put a reasonable and prudent man to his instant defense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 515 (6th ed. 1991). The New York case of
People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) is one of the first cases in which the defendant claimed that post-traumatic experiences led him to believe he was in imminent
danger. If Gutierrez had struck Duran before the night in question, her actions would be
more easily justified, because her belief of danger would have been based in part on
Gutierrez's previous actions.
Duran, 990 P.2d at 1009 (citing WYO. STAT ANN. § 6-1-203 (LEXIS 1999)).
16.
Battered woman syndrome is used to explain the elements of self-defense, particularly
to establish belief of imminent danger. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203 (LEXIS 1999).
The statute does not create a separate defense, but rather permits the introduction of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome when the affirmative defense of selfdefense is raised. Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 143 (Wyo. 1995).
Duran, 990 P.2d at 1007. The Wyoming Supreme Court had addressed the
17.
issue as it applied to involuntary manslaughter in Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420 (Wyo.

1984).
18.

Id. at 1006.
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dresses the 'negative repercussions, fundamental unfairness, and
inconsistencies that will result because defendants who admit their intent
to cause injury or death are given a chance to present their full defense,
while others are not.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision fails to adequately consider situations involving an intentional act that yields an unintentional
result. This note concludes that the majority creates unfairness by deciding that because a defendant's state of mind is less culpable, the defendant is denied any opportunity to demonstrate, based on her subjective
belief, that her actions were justifiable and reasonable given the circumstances.
BACKGROUND
History of Self-Defense
Under early common law, justification for homicide extended
only to acts done in the execution of the law, such as homicides performed in preventing felonies and making arrests.1 9 Only homicides
committed in self-defense were excusable. 20 The distinction between
justifiable and excusable was important, because homicide in selfdefense that was only excusable was not considered to be free of blame
and thus resulted in forfeiture of one's goods.2' With the passage of 24
Henry VIII, 1532, the basis of the justification was enlarged and the distinction between justifiable and excusable homicide largely disappeared.22 The terms became frequently interchangeable to denote "a
nonpunishable act, which entitles the accused to an acquittal. 23 Killing
in self-protection constituted an excusable homicide based on the "great
universal principle of self-preservation," which prompts every man to
save his own life, preferably to that of another, where one of them must
inevitably perish.24
Common law intent was defined to include not only those results
that are the conscious object of the actor, but also those results that the
actor knows are virtually certain to occur from his conduct. 25 The natu-

19.

JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW at

406 n.35 (1st ed. 1994).
20.
Id.
Id.
21.
22.
23.

Id.

24.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND

25.

DRESSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 109.

Id.
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ral-and-probable-consequences doctrine, used by courts for determining
whether someone acted intentionally, states that it is reasonable for a
juror, as with anyone else, to infer that a person usually intends the foreseeable consequences of his actions.26
Several theories of justifiable homicide have been used to support the justification of self-defense. First, public duty is based on the
underlying value of Blackstone's theory that a person acting to promote
the public good or benefit the community should be commended for selfless conduct. 27 Second, the theory of moral forfeiture of right to life is
based on the 2assertion that everyone has a right to life, but that right may
be forfeited: 1
In the context of self-defense, an aggressor, threatening to violate another's right to life, loses her own right to life, or loses the
right to assert her right to life. Consequently, when a defender
kills her in self-defense, the defender is not violating any right of
the aggressor because the aggressor has already forfeited that
right through her own wrongful conduct.2 9
Third, the right to preserve personal autonomy is based on the right to
the integrity and autonomy of one's body.3 ° This theory finds support in
John Locke's analogy that the standard self-defense situation, including
an unlawful aggressor and an innocent victim, is comparable to the justifications underlying a state of war. 3' The lesser evils doctrinestates that
conduct considered blameworthy is justified when the greater good or
the lesser evil results from the homicide, or when a superior interest is
protected through homicide.3 2 According to this doctrine, the harm
avoided, harm that will occur unless something prevents it, should be
weighed against the harm anticipated, harm that will result from the action taken.33 When the harm avoided is greater than the harm anticipated,
the homicide is justified.34
Today, a person acting in self-defense is simply defined as "a
person who is not himself an aggressor if, at the time of its use, he reaId.
26.
Nancy M. Omichinshi, Applying the Theories of Justifiable Homicide to Con27.
flicts in the Doctrine of Self-Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1447, 1448-49 (1987).
Id. at 1450.
28.
29.

Id.

30.

Id. at 1451.

31.
32.

Id. at 1452.
Id. at 1452-53; PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 45-68 (1984).

33.

Omichinshi, supra note 27, at 1453.

34.

Id.
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sonably believes such force is necessary to protect himself from death or
great bodily harm. ' '35 This rudimentary definition often comes with the
requirements that the use of force in self-defense must be proportional to
the interest protected, the defender must use only the minimal amount of
force necessary, and the defender must retreat if possible.36
Self-Defense Outside Wyoming
Other jurisdictions have addressed issues similar to those in
Duran. In Hanton v. State, the Washington Supreme Court found that
self-defense is an appropriate defense to homicide offenses based on
"reckless" conduct.37 The Court in Hanton allowed the defense of selfdefense to a charge of manslaughter, which is considered a reckless offense, because the jury may consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether the defendant was acting recklessly. 38 State v. Hall, a
Connecticut Supreme Court case, held that where the evidence warrants,
the trial court must instruct the jury on self-defense in cases involving
manslaughter in the second degree, a reckless offense. 39 The court reaof as much information as
soned that the jury should have the benefit
40
would help them in reaching a just verdict.
In contrast, in Case v. People the Colorado Supreme Court found
that where the jury is properly instructed on the elements of reckless
Id. at 1454.
Id. at 1454-57. The duty to retreat is not usually required if the victim is in her
36.
home or is attempting an arrest.
614 P.2d 1280 (Wash. 1980).
37.
Id. at 1282. Hanton pulled out in front of the victim's car, which angered the
38.
victim. The victim followed closely behind Hanton's car until they stopped at the next
stoplight. Id. The victim approached Hanton's car and attempted to pull him out. Hanton drew his pistol and shot the victim who died several days later. Id. Hanton was
charged with and convicted of first-degree manslaughter. Id. The Supreme Court of
Washington reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court's instructions improperly placed the burden of proving self-defense upon the defendant. Id.
39.
569 A.2d 534, 536-37 (Conn. 1990). The victim had requested a loan from the
defendant, Hall, to cover money lost in an illegal gambling game. Id. The defendant
did not comply with the request and later the victim provoked an argument that escalated into a physical confrontation, in which the victim cut the defendant with a knife.
Id. The defendant followed the victim outside where he realized the victim was pointing a gun at him. Id. The defendant pulled out his gun and started firing shots that
killed the victim. Id. The Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that the trial court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the defense of self-defense was applicable to
the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. Id.
State v. Hall, 544 A.2d 746 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (Stroughton, J., dissenting).
40.
The dissent in the appellate court's opinion stated that a self-defense instruction should
be given in a reckless manslaughter case if such an instruction is supported by evidence
in the record. Id.
35.
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manslaughter, instructions of self-defense are not necessary because a

finding of guilt based on recklessness amounts to an implied rejection of
self-defense. 4 '
Decisions from other states have also addressed the issue of
whether there can be accidental self-defense. The question often becomes one based on the availability of alternative defenses. The Court
of Appeals of Missouri in State v. Houcks found that asserting selfdefense and accident as a defense are inconsistent:
When claiming self-defense, one acknowledges intentionally inflicting injury or death on another person while asserting such

conduct was necessary because of apprehension of great bodily
harm or death. On the other hand, asserting that injury to another resulted from an accident includes the assertion that the
causal connection was unintentional.4 2

The Houcks court would have allowed both defenses, despite
their inconsistency, so long as both theories of defense had supporting
evidence offered by the state or proved by third party witnesses for the

defense, as the defendant cannot alone provide the basis for inconsistent
defenses.4 3
Self-Defense in Wyoming
The law of self-defense in Wyoming requires that a defendant

act reasonably, as determined by the application of both objective and
subjective tests. 44 The jury is to determine:

774 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1989). This case is distinguishable from Duran in that
41.
Case was allowed to present evidence of self-defense during the trial. Id.
954 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). The defendant, Michelle Houcks,
42.
was separated from her husband when she returned to their home to remove some of her
belongings and saw another woman in the home. Id. The defendant returned the following day and threw a cup of gasoline on her husband. Id. Her husband grabbed her
by the wrists. Id. Houcks was holding a lighter that sparked, igniting both her and her
husband. Id. The court did not allow a theory of self-defense, because no supporting
evidence existed. Id.
Id. at 639.
43.
Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 825 (Wyo. 1991). After the consumption of
44.
alcohol at Ramos's residence an argument ensued that resulted in Ramos fatally stabbing the victim. Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the conviction of second
degree murder and held that Ramos's actions did not give rise to the defense of selfdefense, because the evidence did not indicate that Ramos could have reasonably believed he was in immediate danger of losing his life or of suffering serious bodily injury. Id.
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(1) Whether a defendant believed, at the time of death, that she
was in such immediate danger of losing her own life, or receiving serious bodily injury, as made it necessary to take the life of
her assailant; and (2) whether the circumstances were such to
warrant reasonable grounds for such belief in the mind of a
reasonable man.45
Wyoming recognizes that homicide in self-defense exists only
where the defendant believed at the time of the death that she was in
imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death.46 Pattersonv. State
summarizes the Wyoming cases dealing with self-defense as a defense to
homicide:
To excuse homicide on the grounds of self-defense, one must establish the following: (1) that the slayer was not at fault in bringing on the difficulty (2) that he believed, at the time of the killing, that he was in such immediate danger of losing his own life,
or of receiving serious bodily injury, as made it necessary to take
the life of his assailant (3) that the circumstances were such to
warrant reasonable grounds for such belief in the mind of a reasonable man (4) that there was no other reasonable method of escaping or otherwise resolving conflict.4 7
The common law rule is similar to the rule in Wyoming in that
the use of deadly force against another in self-defense is justifiable only
if one reasonably believes that the other is about to inflict unlawful death
or serious injury upon him and that deadly force is necessary to prevent
infliction of death or injury to oneself. 48 Wyoming Statute Section 6-1102 (b) states that common law defenses are retained unless otherwise
provided.4 9
When viewing the evidence to determine whether an instruction
of self-defense should be given, the evidence should be viewed in the
light most favorable to the defendant and the defendant's testimony
should be taken as entirely true.5 ° To guarantee that the basic requirements of due process are met, the trial court must instruct the jury on the
45.

Id.

46. Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 746 (Wyo. 1987).
682 P.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Wyo. 1984). See also Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148
47.
(Wyo. 1983).
LAFAVRE & SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7(b) at 652 (1986).
48.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-102 (LEXIS 1999).
49.
Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400, 409 (Wyo. 1977); Patterson v. State, 682 P.2d
50.
1049, 1050 (Wyo. 1984).
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defendant's theory of the case.5 ' The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant's right to present evidence in her
defense. 2 Further, a defendant has the right to have the theory of her
case affirmatively presented to the jury if there is competent evidence in
the record to support her theory.5 3 Evidence from the testimony of the
defendant alone is enough to allow the jury to judge the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.5 4
The Wyoming Supreme Court has clearly indicated that most
crimes are general intent crimes and do not require proof of intent to
cause a specific harm. 5 General intent implies that the intent is not a
requires only that the prohibited conseparate element of the crime and
56
duct be voluntarily undertaken.
When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of
a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or
achieve a future consequence, the fact that the defendant intended to do the proscribed act makes that crime a general criminal intent offense. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.5 7
In Foley v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated that "it is
perfectly evident that one may kill another in self-defense, yet without
any intention or expectation that his assailant shall be killed. 5 ' Foley
held that it is not a presumption of law nor is it a matter of fact that a
person killing in self-defense intended to kill. 59 The court found that an
instruction submitted to the jury was erroneous because the instruction
stated that a claim of self-defense presupposes that the deceased was
intentionally killed. 6°
Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127, 129 (Wyo. 1970).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 1995).
53.
54. Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Wyo. 1983).
See Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1986); Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754
55.
(Wyo. 1993). These cases involve second-degree murder.
51.

56.

Specific intent means that the intent is or may be made an element of the crime,

which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as any other fact in the case. Crozier
v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 52 (Wyo. 1986).
Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 641 (Wyo. 1983).
57.
58. 72 P.2d 627, 628 (Wyo. 1903). The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the
jury conviction for murder in the second degree. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. If it is clear from the evidence that the killing was intentional it may not be
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In Baier v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the defendant only needed to act reasonably, not intentionally, to warrant a
self-defense instruction. 61 The right to defend oneself and the amount of
force permitted is relative to what is necessary under the circumstances.62 In Baier, whether the appellant's acts were reasonable became
a question for the jury because, according to the court, the jury should
determine whether a defendant perceived a threat of immediate injury
under the circumstances and whether the defendant defended himself
reasonably.6 3
Similarly, the defendant in Small v. State was charged with involuntary manslaughter, based on criminal recklessness, and the trial
court gave eight instructions on self-defense. 64 In Small, the Wyoming
Supreme Court arguably implied that instructions on self-defense are
appropriate for any reckless offense by deciding self-defense instructions
were appropriate for the reckless offense of involuntary manslaughter.65
Small placed the burden on the state to prove the absence of self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt.66
Defense of Others in Wyoming
Shortly before Duran, the Wyoming Supreme Court expanded
the scope of "defense of others" in Duckett v. State.67 In Duckett, Steven
Wayne Duckett was convicted of aggravated assault for stabbing a man
in an altercation. 68 The Wyoming Supreme Court found that the district
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on defense of others as a legal

prejudicial or reversible error.
61.
891 P.2d at 758. Bajer was a case concerning an aggravated assault and battery
not a homicide. Baier was charged and found guilty of aggravated assault and battery
after he stabbed a man in the eye with a fork at the Village Inn restaurant in Cheyenne,
Wyoming following a verbal confrontation. Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64. 689 P.2d 420, 422 (Wyo. 1984). Alcohol and racial slurs led to a fight that resulted in the death of Eddie Vigil. Small was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in
violation of WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105 (a)(ii)(B) (LEXIS 1999). Id. The Wyoming
Supreme Court found that the trial court properly instructed the jury on self-defense and
the duty to retreat. Id. The jury should be properly instructed on self-defense and the
element of recklessness, because a person acting in self-defense cannot be acting recklessly. Id. Thus if a jury is able to find that a defendant acted recklessly, it has already
precluded a finding of self-defense. Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
966 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1998).
68.
Id.
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69
justification for Duckett's actions. The court stated, "defense of others
as justification for the infliction of harm on another is applicable not
only to an actual assailant, but also to those acting in concert with the
70
and reasonable."
assailant to the extent the defensive force is necessary

Battered Woman Syndrome
Battered woman syndrome is defined as "a constellation of
common characteristics which are manifested by women who have been
abused physically and psychologically over a prolonged period of time
by the dominant male in their lives.",71 Traditionally, courts did not accept evidence of abuse to justify the use of deadly force, because a defense based on abuse did not fit'neatly into the traditional definition of
self-defense.72
Relationships characterized by abuse often develop battering cycles. Usually, the cycles consist of three distinct, repetitive states that
74
vary in intensity and duration depending on the individuals involved.
State v. Kelly outlined the cycles of battering:
73

Phase one of the battering cycle is referred to as the "tension
building stage," during which the battering male engages in battering incidents and verbal abuse while the woman, beset by fear
and tension, attempts to be as placating and passive as possible
in order to stave off more serious violence.
Phase two of the battering cycle is the "acute battering incident."
At some point during phase one, the tension between the battered
woman and the batterer becomes more intolerable and more violence is inevitable. The triggering event that initiates phase two
is most often an internal or external event in the life of the batId. at 943. Duckett and his wife were at the home of Mary Carlson recording
69.
music in the garage with several friends. Fighting began and Carlson asked the
Ducketts to leave, but the Ducketts had to return to the garage to retrieve the tapes containing Duckett's uncopyrighted original material. Id. Carlson pushed Duckett's wife
away when she reached for the music. Id. Carlson was on top of Duckett's wife slamming her head on the ground, when Duckett stabbed Hetler, Carlson's boyfriend, because Hetler would not release Duckett so he could help his wife who was screaming
that Carlson was trying to kill her. Id.
Id. at 948.
70.
Elizabeth L. Turk, Abuses and Syndromes: Excuses or Justifications? 18
71.
WHITTIER L. REV. 901, 907 (1997).

72.

Id.

73.
74.

Id.
Id.
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tering male, but provocation for more severe violence is sometimes provided by the woman who can no longer tolerate her
phase-one anger and anxiety.
Phase three of the battering cycle is characterized by extreme
contrition and loving behavior on the part of the battering male.
During this period the man will often mix his pleas for forgiveness and protestations of devotion with promises to seek professional help, to stop drinking, and to refrain from further violence.75
However, a "cycle of violence" is not a necessary component of a battering relationship, because scientific literature does not support a universal
"cycle of violence" pattern in all battering relationships.7 6
A battered woman is one who is repeatedly subjected to forceful
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to
do without concern for her rights.7 7 The effects experienced by many
battered women may be "similar or identical to those for post-traumatic
stress disorder: learned helplessness, re-experiencing of the trauma,
intrusive recollections, generalized anxiety, lowered self-esteem, and
social withdrawal. 78
Battered woman syndrome seeks to explain the reactions of particular women to trauma and the threats of trauma and has been characterized as a subset of post-traumatic stress disorder. 79 The symptoms of
post-traumatic stress disorder include the intrusion of a traumatic memory into the individual's consciousness and avoidance of feelings and
75.

478 A.2d 364, 372-78 (N. J. 1984).

76.
MARY ANN DUTTON, Ph.D, VALIDITY OF AND USE OF EVIDENCE
CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 18. (Malcom

Gordon, Ph.D ed., 1996). (This is a report responding to section 40507 of the Violence
Against Women Act, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National
Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute
of Mental Health). At the time of the incident, the "cycle of violence" does not seem to
be present in Duran and Gutierrez's relationship, unless the cycle is in stage one.
77.
78.

LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN XV (1979).
DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND

CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSPECTIVES 200 (1995). The essential feature of post-traumatic
stress disorder is the development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically distressing event outside of the range of usual human experience. Id. Certain
behaviors or events can lead a woman to believe that a prior severe act of violence
against her is reoccurring even if it is not. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 199-200 (1995). Learned helplessness helps explain why battered
women may not leave abusive relationships. Id.
79.
DUTTON, supra note 76, at 19.
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thoughts associated with the experience or decreasing general responsiveness.80 Restricting the definition of battered woman syndrome to
post-traumatic stress disorder alone may exclude other potentially relevant and important information that may be instrumental to factfinders in
considering the various issues of a case by providing a more complete
8
foundation for which to view a defendant's actions. '
In applicable case law, the Supreme Court of Washington in
State v. Wanrow held in a self-defense case that the woman defendant
was "entitled to have the jury consider her actions in light of her own
perceptions of the situation." 2 In State v. Kelly, the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first state supreme court to admit expert testi83
mony of battered woman syndrome to help prove self-defense. In addition to using battered woman syndrome in support of a defense of selfdefense, battered woman syndrome is now also considered relevant in
84
support of a defense of insanity or duress. Battered woman syndrome
is also used to support mitigating factors in charging and sentencing and
5
to explain misconceptions related to domestic violence.
Battered Woman Syndrome in Wyoming
Before Wyoming enacted its battered woman syndrome statute,
Wyoming Statute Section 6-1-203, Wyoming courts did not allow expert
6 In Buhrle v. State,
testimony concerning battered woman syndrome.
for example, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that battered woman
syndrome was only recognized by a few people actively engaged in re87 The
search and that research on the subject was in its early stages.
court continued that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
would not be of use to the jury.8 8 In Buhrle, the Wyoming Supreme
Court found that the defendant did not create an adequate foundation for
80.

Id.

81.

Id.

559 P.2d 548, 559 (Wash. 1977).
82.
478 A.2d 364, 368 (N.J. 1984). Kelly stabbed her husband with a pair of scis83.
sors, and he died soon after. The trial court ruled that the testimony on battered woman
syndrome inadmissible, but the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Kelly could introduce expert testimony on BWS to prove self-defense. Id.
DUTTON, supra note 76, at 1-3.
84.
Id. at 2-3.
85.
Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981).
86.
627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981). The defendant and the victim were married.
87.
The victim abused the defendant. Id. The defendant shot the victim through a partially
shut door, because she claimed he was reaching for a gun he kept under his bed. Id.
The Wyoming Supreme Court refused testimony on battered woman syndrome. Id.
Id.
88.
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the expert's testimony, but did not hold that testimony regarding battered
woman syndrome was always inadmissible. 9
The Wyoming Supreme Court held in Witt v. State that "Wyoming Statute Section 6-1-203 does not permit expert testimony on the
accused's state of mind at the time of the violent act, and the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding such testimony as unhelpful to the trier of fact." 90 Under Witt, a battered woman has the right to
have experts testify about battered woman syndrome to substantiate a
self-defense claim, but not to have experts testify as to her state of mind
at the time she committed the crime. 9' This theory was extended in Ryan
v. State, where the Wyoming Supreme Court held that expert testimony
on separation violence common in abusive relationships was inadmissible as character evidence. 92
The Wyoming Supreme Court was more willing to allow evidence in support of battered woman syndrome in Trujillo v. State.93 In
that case the court held that testimony on domestic violence and battered
woman syndrome should have been admissible because the testimony
could have helped the jury understand the victim's behavior and was
based on recognized syndromes. 94
Under Wyoming's statute, battered woman syndrome is not a defense in itself but rather serves as evidence that may be relevant to a
self-defense claim. 95 The Wyoming battered woman statute does not
purport to explain actions that are done with the intent to kill, but the
statute does explain the use of force to a threat based on the belief of
imminent danger.96
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Duran v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court identified four
issues that Cheryl Duran raised on appeal. 97 This case note focuses on
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1378.
892 P.2d 132, 138 (Wyo. 1995).
Id.

92.
88 P.2d 46, 56 (Wyo. 1999). Separation violence is the term used to describe
the violence that occurs when a batterer attempts to prevent a battered woman from
leaving. Id.
93.
953 P.2d 1182 (Wyo. 1998).
94.
Id.

95.

Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 143 (Wyo. 1995).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203 (LEXIS 1999); see supra note 15.
97.
990 P.2d 1005, 1006 (Wyo. 1999). The four issues raised on appeal by the petitioner were: (1) whether the district court committed reversible error when it refused
96.
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two of these issues: the issue regarding self-defense instructions and the
issue concerning expert testimony on battered woman syndrome.
In Duran, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the affirmative
defense of self-defense was not available to Duran because she was
charged with a crime based on a reckless act rather than an intentional
act.9 The Wyoming Supreme Court first considered whether the trial
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. Duran argued
that Small v. State was controlling because Small implied that selfdefense was an appropriate defense to criminal recklessness, which is an
element for vehicular homicide. 99 The Duran court stated, however, that
"rather than implying that self-defense is a proper defense to criminal
recklessness, Small implies that self-defense instructions were not necessary because a finding of recklessness precludes a finding of selfdefense."' °
Because Duran presented an issue of first impression in Wyoming as to whether self-defense is an appropriate affirmative defense to
a crime involving recklessness rather than an intentional act, the Wyoming Supreme Court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. The
court followed the view of the majority of jurisdictions holding that selfdefense requires intentional conduct, and that a claim of self-defense
101
necessarily serves as an admission that the conduct was intentional.
The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the views of the Indiana and
Pennsylvania courts that self-defense encompasses both intentional and
accidental killings. 10 2 Ultimately, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
self-defense requires intentional conduct, and recklessness involves an
unintentional act. 10 3 The court claimed that the jury had the applicable
Appellant's instructions on her theory of self-defense; (2) whether the district court
erred in refusing expert testimony on battered woman syndrome; (3) whether Appellant
was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to give notice of intent
to introduce expert testimony on battered woman syndrome; (4) whether the trial court
erred by admitting evidence about the victim's character for peacefulness before Appellant showed the victim was the first aggressor. Id. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme
Court did not find for Duran on any of the issues and held that the trial court did not
commit reversible error. Id. at 1011.
98.

Id.

99.

Id. at 1009.

100.

Id.

State v. Blanks, 712 A.2d 698, 703 (N. J. 1998).
101.
Id. Self-defense may be asserted when the accused exerts proper force against
102.
the assailant whose death resulted accidentally. Shackelford v. State, 486 N.E.2d 1014,
1016 (Ind. 1986). A self-defense charge is appropriate in cases involving accidental
injury when the accidental injury or death occurred while the defendant was defending
himself. Commonwealth v. McFadden, 587 A.2d 740, 742 (Pa. 1991).
103.

Duran, 990 P.2d at 1009.
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law without the instruction on self-defense, because the jury had instructions on the elements of the offense and the definitions of "recklessness" and "proximate cause. ' °4
The next issue the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed was
Duran's argument that the trial court erred when it refused to admit expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome.' 0 5 Duran argued
that expert testimony was needed to explain her history of abuse and to
show that her actions were based on a reasonably perceived danger of
bodily injury or death.10 6 In rejecting Duran's claim the court reasoned
that "once the trial court determined that self-defense was not an appropriate defense in this case, and this Court agrees with that determination,
reliance on the statute was misplaced.' 0 7
The Wyoming Supreme Court thought that the primary purpose
of Duran's desire to use expert testimony was to establish that Duran's
actions on the night in question were reasonable and concluded that the
trial court did not err in refusing the expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome. 0 8 The court, relying on its previous decision in Witt v. State,
held that Wyoming Statute Section 6-1-203 does not permit expert testimony as to the state of mind of the accused when the crime was committed.' 9 The court stated:
Testimony on the accused's state of mind at the time of the violent act, however, would not be helpful to the jury. An expert
has no basis for evaluating the accused's state of mind when she
committed the crime, and such testimony would usurp the function of the jury. Testimony on the accused's state of mind at the
time of the crime would constitute an opinion on the accused's
credibility and guilt because it would be comment upon what the
accused actually believed." 0
ChiefJustice Lehman's Dissent
In dissent, Chief Justice Lehman disputed the majority's notion
that "a charge of recklessness involves an unintentional act," because
104.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1008.
1010.
107.
1009.
1010. The court also reviewed the issues of ineffective counsel, Rule
108.
404(a)(2) testimony on the first aggressor, and W.R.E. 611 on testimony order to determine if the trial court erred. Id. at 1010-11.
109.
Id. at 1010.
Id. (quoting Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 138 (Wyo. 1995)).
110.
105.
106.
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that is not always the case. 1 ' Chief Justice Lehman argued that there
was no question that Duran intended to dislodge the victim from the
hood of the car and to do what was necessary to escape further confrontation with her attacker.'" 2 "In fact," Chief Justice Lehman wrote, "she
intentionally slammed on her breaks to forcibly remove her attacker and
allow her escape.""' 3 While she did not intend to hurt him, Chief Justice
Lehman argued, she voluntarily chose to use whatever force the situation
demanded." 4 In his dissent Chief Justice Lehman illustrated an inherent
problem with the majority's decision: "The question before the jury was
whether that intention was a conscious disregard of a 'substantial and
unjustifiablerisk' and her actions constituted a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonableperson would observe in the situation."'' 5
Chief Justice Lehman noted that a fine line exists between those
cases in which the court will allow the theory of self-defense and those
cases in which the theory is prohibited. He stated, "I cannot distinguish
this scenario from those in which we allow a criminal defendant to claim
self-defense."'" 6 His dissent continued that had Duran stated that she
intended to harm her attacker and the prosecutor had charged her with
intentional homicide, the jury would have considered the reasonableness
of her actions given the basis for her subjective belief of immediate danger. 17 According to Chief Justice Lehman, the majority denied Duran
the opportunity to show that her subjective belief created a situation in
which her conduct was reasonable and justified, simply because her state
18
of mind was less culpable, or at least labeled such by the prosecutor.
In summary, Chief Justice Lehman considered Duran an illustration of "the fundamental unfairness caused by confusing 'an uninten9
tional act' with what really is an unintended consequence."" Duran's
not unintentional, but rather the victim's
actions, he concluded, were
20
unintentional.
death was
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1011 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting) (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-104(a)(ix) (Mi-

chie Cum. Supp. 1995)).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1012 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
To further illustrate the point Chief Justice Lehman used a hypothetical situa-

tion.
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ANALYSIS

In Duran, the Wyoming Supreme Court not only limited the
scope of self-defense, but created confusion as to the theory's applicability by allowing its use only when the actor has committed or is accused
of committing an intentional act. The Wyoming Supreme Court reveals
a fundamental unfairness by deciding that because the defendant's state
of mind is labeled less culpable, the defendant is not given the opportunity to present a defense that may demonstrate to the jury that her actions are justifiable and reasonable given the underlying circumstances.
Another potential unfairness that exists for women results from the
structure of self-defense laws.
The source of the confusion comes from the Wyoming Supreme
Court's failure to consider that there can be an intentional act yielding an
unintentional result. 12 1 Cheryl Duran intended to do whatever was necessary to escape further confrontation with Gutierrez.12 2 The law of selfdefense states that the defender must retreat if possible to avoid using
unnecessary force, but Duran could not retreat with Gutierrez on the
hood of the car.123 Duran may not have intended to hurt the victim, but
she did intend to do what was required to dislodge him from the hood of
the car so that she could escape. 124 By classifying Duran's actions as
reckless, an unintentional 25act was mistaken for what actually was an unintentional consequence.'
The existing confusion is also a result of the Wyoming Supreme
Imagine the defendant is faced with a deadly assailant and, in response, the intended
victim points and shoots the gun at the attacker's legs, meaning to incapacitate him.
However, the defendant's lack of skill causes the bullet to enter the assailant's heart, instantly killing him. Should the prosecutor choose to charge him with manslaughter under Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-105 (a)(ii), will we deny a claim of self-defense at trial? Under the
majority holding, we do.

Id. (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
121.
Id. at 1012 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
122.
Id. at 1011 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting); Respondent's Brief, supra note 2, at 8-9.
123.
See Omichinshi, supra note 27, at 1457-58. Note that Duran attempted to retreat both by walking home and by driving off in the car, but the aggressor attached
himself to the hood making retreat difficult, if not impossible. Appellant's Brief, supra
note 5, at 4-5. Wyoming relies on a common law duty to retreat and does not have a
statutory definition to this effect. Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Wyo. 1983).
124.
Duran slammed on her brakes, swerved the car, and varied her speed in an attempt to remove her attacker from the hood. Respondent's Brief, supra note 2, at 8-9.
125.
Duran, 990 P.2d at 1012 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting). The early Wyoming case
of Foley v. State recognized that "it is perfectly evident that one may kill another in
self-defense, yet without any intention or expectation that his assailant will be killed."
72 P.2d 627, 629 (Wyo. 1903).
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Court's limited explanation of its decision. The decision did not adequately address why the jury should not be allowed to hear the circum-

stances surrounding the incident or to consider the validity of Duran's

reasons for her actions. Duran may deserve to be held responsible for
her actions, but certainly she should have been allowed to present her
theory of defense based on self-defense and battered woman syndrome

to the jury. The jury could then sort through the reasoning and establish
was valid and make a rational deciwhether or not the theory of defense
1 26
facts.
the
of
all
on
sion based

Under Wyoming Statute Section 6-1-104(a)(ix) the question before the jury was whether Duran's intention was a conscious disregard of

a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" and whether her actions constituted
"a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
27
would observe in the situation."' The Wyoming Supreme Court failed
to acknowledge the difficulty a jury has in determining whether the risk

is substantial and unjustifiable and whether the conduct differs from that
of a reasonable person if the entire defense is not allowed. Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome and a defense based on self-defense

could have aided the jury in their determination of whether Duran's actions were reasonable and justifiable. Also, instructions on self-defense
could assist the jury in determining whether the actions were reckless.

The jury is entitled to all of the applicable information before arriving at an informed decision.' 2' The jury, not the court, has the duty of

determining whether Duran's acts were reasonable, as the jury deter-

of imminent danger and the actions
mines whether the perceived threat
29
used in defense were reasonable.

The question of reasonableness of the defendant's state of belief is, of course,
126.
for the jury. Patterson v. State, 682 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Wyo. 1984).
Duran, 990 P.2d at 1012 (Lehman, C. J., dissenting). Chief Justice Lehman
127.
cites Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-104 (a)(ix) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1995) that is the same as
WYO. STAT. ANN § 6-1-104 (LEXIS 1999).
The reasoning behind the decision that instructions on self-defense were appli128.
cable in State v. Hall, was that the jury should have the benefit of as much information
as possible to help them in reaching a just verdict. 544 A.2d 746 (Conn. App. Ct.
1989).
Baier, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 1995). In Wyoming, self-defense requires a
129.
jury finding that a defendant's actions were reasonable. Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148,
1152-53 (Wyo. 1983). It is for the jury to determine whether a defendant believed at the
time of the death that she was in such immediate danger of losing her own life or receiving bodily injury that it was necessary to take the life of the assailant. Ramos v. State,
806 P.2d 822, 825 (Wyo. 1991). It is also for the jury to determine whether the circumstances provided reasonable grounds for such belief in the mind of a reasonable person.
Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2001

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 1 [2001], No. 2, Art. 13
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. I

Among the negative repercussions that will result from the
Wyoming Supreme Court's decisions are the inevitable inconsistencies
that will occur depending on whether or not a theory of self-defense is
allowed. If Duran had merely said that she intended to injure Gutierrez,
Duran would have been allowed to present her entire theory of defense
and possibly change the outcome of the trial.130 Duran would have presented the justification for her actions under a theory of self-defense and
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome, which was essential for
her showing of imminent harm. Arguably, this decision may encourage
"defense for self' in trial planning in that a defendant may say she intended the harm or death, even if she did not, and face greater charges in
order to have a chance to present her entire defense to the jury, resulting
in a stronger case. As unlikely as it may seem, the idea of admitting to
doing something more culpable for a chance to show that one's actions
are justified may be a reasonable decision when faced with the less
promising option of being forced to present a case without a true theory
of defense.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Lehman stated, "I cannot distinguish
this scenario from those in which we allow a criminal defendant to claim
self-defense.'' With this existing confusion between an intentional act
and an unintentional result, decisions are likely to vary despite the similarity of the facts, thus creating a fundamental unfairness grounded in
ambiguity. Part of the ambiguity is derived from the understanding of
the meaning of intent. The court chose to look to the intentional act
rather than the unintentional consequence to make its decision. As Chief
Justice Lehman acknowledges in his dissent, "the majority holds that the
theory of self-defense is unavailable to one who is charged with recklessly causing a result because a charge of recklessness always involves
an unintentional act. This is not always the case as Ms. Duran's di32
lemma illustrates.',

The classification of Duran's state of mind was based on her
statement that she did not intend the death of Gutierrez, not on the basis
that she did intend to do whatever was necessary to distance herself from
Gutierrez to prevent further physical abuse. Because the prosecutor
130.

"Whether a killing was necessary is a question of fact," and juries should be

allowed to "realistically consider, given the totality of the facts of any given situation,
whether the use of defensive force was necessary." Jeffrey B. Murdoch, Is Imminence
Really Necessity? Reconciling Traditional Self-Defense Doctrine with the Battered
Woman Syndrome, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 191, 217 (2000) (arguing for elimination of

imminence requirement for self-defense).
131.
Duran, 990 P.2d at 1012 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
132.
Id. at 1011 (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
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chose to label her act as less culpable, she was denied the opportunity to
present a justification for her actions based on her perceived danger under the circumstances. Had the prosecutor labeled her actions based on
to
her intent to dislodge Gutierrez from the hood rather than her intent
33
result.
different
dramatically
a
had
have
kill him, the case could
Further adding to the confusion, the Wyoming Supreme Court's
decisions on related issues are inconsistent with its holding in Duran. In
Small v. State, the court implied that self-defense instructions were ap134
propriate for the reckless offense of involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter and aggravated vehicular homicide are both reckless offenses and should be treated similarly with respect to the use of
self-defense as an affirmative defense. The Small court stated, "henceforth, when self-defense is properly raised the jury should be specifically
instructed that the state has the burden to prove the absence of self35
Arguably, if self-defense indefense beyond a reasonable doubt."'
the same should be true
offense,
reckless
structions are permitted for one
of another, thus leaving the crucial questions of reasonableness and legitimacy to the jury. The inconsistency created by this rigid line drawing seems unjust. The court in Duran based its decision on the premise
that Duran had committed a reckless act and therefore self-defense was
not available to her. If a distinction truly exists as to why a self-defense
instruction is permitted for involuntary manslaughter but not vehicular
homicide, the Duran court should have premised its distinction on the
act committed, not on the elements of the act committed.
The inconsistency surrounding the Wyoming Supreme Court's
decision continues when Duran is compared with Duckett v. State, where

This argument brings up a compelling related issue of prosecutorial discretion.
133.
Ultimately, the prosecutor decided what to charge Duran with. The prosecutor should
have considered self-defense and battered woman syndrome as a possible part of the
fact scenario but likely based the decision solely on the fact that Duran stated that she
did not intend to kill Gutierrez. The irony here is that Duran was charged with a lesser
offense but had she been charged with a greater offense, she arguably would have stood
a better chance for acquittal through the support of the theory of self-defense. A potential for abusive use of prosecutorial discretion exists in that a prosecutor may charge a
reckless offense to avoid having to deal with self-defense. In State v. Isom, the defendant stated that he did not intend to kill the victim and the court stated that such a
statement was not determinative of whether or not an involuntary manslaughter instruction was authorized. 906 S.W.2d 870, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). The court in Isom held
that the testimony must be measured against the facts, and a testimonial denial of intent
to kill may not authorize an instruction on involuntary manslaughter where the defendant's conduct was likely to produce death. Id.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 16.
134.
Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 423 (Wyo. 1984).
135.
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the court expanded the scope of "defense of others.' ' 6 Both selfdefense and defense of others have derived from the same common goal
of seeking justification for one's actions; however the court's decisions
in the two cases are inconsistent despite their common origin. 3 7 The
inconsistency arises from the court's willingness to expand the application of defense of others and then limit the use of self-defense, despite
the similar purpose of explaining one's actions.
Not only is a fundamental unfairness apparent in the absence of a
distinction between an intentional act and an unintentional result, but
also in the structure of self-defense laws as related to abused women.'
Although women kill less frequently than men do, it is significant that
when women do kill, the victims are often men they knew well, such as
husbands or lovers.'3 9 A question exists as to whether a woman is more
privileged to use more force, such as deadly force, than her male attacker. 40 "To expect or demand that women, who are likely to be
smaller and less adept with their fists than most men, respond like
schoolboys in the yard when attacked may leave them utterly without
defenses.' 4 ' According to one scholar:
Women have been disadvantaged severely in their attempts to
gain acquittal on the grounds of self-defense because a woman's
reasonable response to physical violence is likely different from
a man's because of her size, [and] strength . . . . Even more
problematic is the fact that the traditionally male-conceived nothat
tion of necessity does not include the kind of circumstances
42
women face in the context of a battering relationship.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision failed to realize the no
win situation that Duran was in on the night in question and illustrates
the disadvantages a woman confronts when faced with defending herself.
If Duran remained in the car, the facts suggest that Gutierrez would have
gotten in, as he was pulling on the partially opened window. 43 Duran's
136.
Duckett v. State, 966 P.3d 941 (Wyo. 1998); see supra note 69.
137.
Commonwealth v. Martin, 341 N.E.2d. 885, 891 (Mass. 1976). The court considered the claim of self-defense to be a less esoteric justification than defense of others.
Steffani J. Saitow, Battered Woman Syndrome: Does the "ReasonableBattered
138.
Woman" Exist? 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 329, 346-47 (1993).
139.
Deborah Kochan, Beyond Battered Woman Syndrome. An Argument for Development of New Standards and the Incorporation of a Feminine Approach to Ethics, 1
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 95-96 (1989).
Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1432 (1990).
140.
Id.
141.
142.
Kochan, supra note 139, at 98.
143.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 5.
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only legitimate option may have been to attempt to escape further confrontation, but Gutierrez made that impossible when he attached himself
to the hood of the car. 1 " As one author stated, "Since necessity does not
contemplate living with physical abuse, the possibility of a fundamental
right to live free from abuse never enters into the equation that balances
against the rights of a woman to preserve her
the rights of the attacker
45
physical integrity."'
A different standard of self-defense for women is one potential
way to eliminate or reduce the unfairness. A blanket generalization
seems the best starting place because no two men or women are alike.
But then all of the relevant factors must be included for the jury to consider the applicability of self-defense as it applies to a given situation
and the given individual. The respective sizes and sex of the assailant
and defendant must be taken into account in determining the amount of
force that was appropriate for the situation. 46 Duran did what she felt
she had to do in order to prevent further injury to herself. Given her
history of abuse, Duran may have been justified in her belief that she
not allowed to conwas in danger of injury or death, but the jury 1was
47
sider the reasonableness of such a justification.
In State v Wanrow, the Washington Supreme Court held that a
woman defending herself should be allowed to have the jury consider
her actions in light of her own perceptions of the situation. 48 Wyoming
should adopt this subjective analysis which would allow the defendant to
better reach the jury in her explanation of her actions by asking the jury
to see the situation through her eyes, given her history and the overriding

circumstances. 149
An attempt to fit a battered woman into a perfect self-defense
doctrine utilizing a reasonable person standard is analogous to
trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. The battered woman
is not a reasonably prudent person. Her characteristics and personality have been severely affected by the abuse which she has
endured. She should not be punished for being a victim of that
abuse. Considering her acts only in the light of a reasonable per-

144.

Id.

145.
146.
147.
148.

Kochan, supra note 139, at 97-98.
Turk, supra note 71, at 906.
See supra note 15.
559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).

149.

See Saitow, supra note 138, at 350-51.
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son, when through no fault of her own she150
does not qualify as
suffering.
her
condemning
essence
in
is
one,
The Duran court hastily concluded that the only purpose to be
served by allowing the expert testimony on battered woman syndrome in
Duran was to establish her state of mind on the night in controversy.
However, expert testimony on battered woman syndrome was needed to
educate the jury on battering and its effects so that the jurors could see
the interplay between Duran's actions and the claim of self-defense.'
In order for a jury to understand whether Duran reasonably believed she
was in imminent danger of death or serious injury, the jury needed to
perceive the situation from Duran's perspective-that of a battered
woman. 152
Duran would have benefited from expert testimony, because it
would have explained "the common experiences of, and the impact of
repeated abuse on, battered women."1 3 This would have helped the jury
understand the context of Duran's actions.1 54 Even if only general expert
testimony were permitted in Duran, the jury would have had a better
framework from which to decide whether Duran's actions were reasonable and justifiable. 5 5 Additionally, expert testimony might have
cleared up any misconceptions that existed in the minds of the jury and
56
might have given more validity to the serious effects of battering.
Misconceptions held by triers of fact can negate either the occurrence or
seriousness of violence and the victim's response of fear and intimidation. 5 7 Expert testimony can also help the factfinders understand the

150.
Id. at 367.
151.
Kochan, supra note 139, at 97-98.
152.
Turk, supra note 71, at 946.
153.
E.M. Schneider, Describingand Changing: Women's self-defense work and the
problem of expert testimony on battering,9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 198 (1986).
154.
This type of expert testimony is often referred to as social framework testimony
as it employs "social science research to provide a social and psychological context in
which the trier can understand and evaluate claims about the ultimate fact." N. VIDMAR
and R.A. SCHULLER, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework Testimony. LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 133 (1989).
155.
General testimony is based on scientific and clinical knowledge about domestic
violence and its effects on battered women. Dutton, supra note 76, at 21. With this
testimony, the expert does not form opinions or conclusions related to the specific case.
Id. Case-specific testimony provides information about a particular battered woman and
the context in which the domestic violence occurred. Id.
156.
DUTTON, supra note 76, at 20.
157.
Id. at 3-4.
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battered woman's appraisal of a threat and her response to that threat.5 8
Additionally, expert testimony as to Duran's history of abuse would be
significant. A battered woman who suffers from posttraumatic stress
because she reexperidisorder may perceive a situation as dangerous
59
ences prior trauma through flashbacks.
Notwithstanding the Wyoming battered woman statute, battered
woman syndrome was relevant to whether Duran's risk was justifiable
and whether Duran's conduct was a gross deviation from what was reasonable under the circumstances. 60 Given the need to establish the reasonableness and justifiability of a person's actions, testimony on battered
evaluate far more
woman syndrome could help the jury more accurately
161
than the battered woman aspect of the case.
Granted controversy surrounds a number of the existing defenses
that can be raised in an attempt to avoid punishment for crimes committed. One scholar notes that the "abuse excuse-the legal tactic by which
criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent
retaliation-is quickly becoming a license to kill.' 6 2 Battered woman
syndrome may have stretched the boundaries of self-defense and may
not fit within the traditional framework of a self-defense theory, because
historically the standard for determining a reasonable amount of force or
belief of imminent danger was based on a reasonable
reasonable
"man.' 63 The jury, however, should be the ultimate judge of whether or
not the particular defendant before them is using the "abuse excuse" as a
"license to kill" or whether the defense provides a justified basis for ac-

158.
Id. at 8. The nature of the threat can be objectively determined from the disparity between the two individuals in size, weight, strength and/or skill in using physical
force. Id.
159.
Id. at 11.
160.
Consideration should be given to whether Wyoming's battered woman syndrome statute, Wyo. STAT. ANN § 6-1-203 (LEXIS 1999), may need updating given the

greater, more accurate data that is now available on the subject. Dutton states that the
term battered woman syndrome is not adequate to refer to the scientific and clinical
knowledge concerning battering and its effects applicable to criminal cases involving
battered women.

DUTTON,

supra note 76, at 17-20.

161.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in other circumstances has been more willing to
allow evidence on battered woman syndrome. In Trujillo v. State, 953 P.2d 1182 (Wyo.
1998) the Wyoming Supreme Court admitted expert testimony on domestic violence and
battered woman syndrome to help the jury understand the victim's behavior. However,
in Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 1999) testimony related to battered woman syn-

drome was found to be inadmissible as character evidence.
162.

ALAN

M.

DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES

3 (1994).
Kochan, supra note 139, at 99.

AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITIES
163.
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quittal.' 64 The variation of facts among cases using battered woman
syndrome as a defense warrants a more subjective analysis of the circumstances of each specific case and the interplay of such circumstance
with the applicable law.
Guidance From Other Jurisdictions
Other jurisdictions have found that self-defense is an appropriate
defense to homicide offenses based on reckless conduct. In Hanton v.
State, the Washington Supreme Court approved self-defense as a defense
65 The Hanton court
to a charge of manslaughter, a reckless offense.
stated that since an act performed in self-defense is not a wrongful act, it
cannot be a gross deviation from the conduct that a reasonable man
would exercise in the same situation. 66 The Washington Supreme Court
concluded that a person acting in self-defense could not be acting recklessly. 67 Under the logic of Hanton, evidence of self-defense should
have been permitted in Duran to refute the existence of the "reckless"
element. 68 The fundamental unfairness in Duran is that because
Duran's actions were labeled reckless and less culpable, she was denied
consideration of whether she was acting in self-defense.
In State v. Hall, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a selfdefense instruction should be given in cases involving manslaughter in
the second degree, a reckless offense. 69 The Hall court based its decision on two lines of reasoning. First, the court recognized the difficulty
in reconciling the concepts of "reckless" and "self-defense," but stated
that "the jury should have the benefit of as much information and in70
Second, under
struction as will aid them in arriving at a just verdict."
Connecticut's definition of self-defense, the justifiability of a defendant's actions is measured from the subjective perspective of what the
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 162; see Patterson v. State, 682 P.2d 1049, 1054
164.
(Wyo. 1984).
Hanton v. State, 614 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Wash. 1980).
165.
Id.
166.
Id. Acting recklessly requires a "gross deviation from the standard of conduct
167.
that a reasonable person would observe" but acting in self-defense when the situation
merits is considered reasonable. Id. Duran should have been allowed to use selfdefense to show she was acting reasonably and therefore not recklessly. Duran tried to
act reasonably by trying to escape first by leaving to avoid confrontation with Gutierrez
and then by trying to remove Gutierrez from the hood. Appellant's Brief, supra note 5,
at 4-5.
Id. Wyoming's definition of recklessly is substantially similar to Washington's
168.
definition of recklessness.
569 A.2d 534, 536-37 (Conn. 1990).
169.
Id. at 536.
170.
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defendant reasonably believes. 7 ' The reckless offense, however, requires the justifiability of the defendant's action to be viewed from an
objective perspective of a reasonable person. 72 The court in Hall concluded that "the conduct may be a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation ... but
at the same time, may be wholly justified if the defendant's beliefs are
reasonable from the perspective of that defendant.', 73 The Wyoming
Supreme Court should have followed the reasoning in Hanton and Hall,
which more effectively confronts the fundamental unfairness that exists
as a result of the questionable compatibility of a reckless offense and of
self-defense.
In order to remedy the dangerous precedent set by Duran, the
legislature or the Wyoming Supreme Court should refine the definition
of "intent" in a way that recognizes the difference between an intentional
act and an unintentional consequence. The issue of act versus consequence needs to be settled by determining whether "intent" applies to, the
act or to the consequence. This issue merits a second look that acknowledges the differences in circumstances and the negative repercussions
that result from a failure to recognize the difference between the act and
the consequence. By acknowledging the necessary distinction, the inconsistency of decisions and the existing fundamental unfairness can be
remedied.
In cases based on a reckless offense similar to Duran, justice
would better be served with more jury involvement to weigh the applicability and validity of the theory of self-defense and its related components. 74 If Duran had simply stated that she intended to harm Gutierrez,
then the jury, not the prosecutor in labeling the charges as less culpable,
would have decided the applicability of the defense theories promoted by
Duran.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court in Duran does not adequately
consider the existing tension between an intentional act and an unintentional consequence. In this case, Duran should have had the opportunity
to demonstrate to the jury, given her subjective belief at the time, that
the risk she took was justifiable and that the conduct she engaged in to
protect herself from what she perceived to be a dangerous situation was
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 537-38.
Id.

174.

See Hanton v. State, 614 P.2d 1280 (Wash. 1980).

Id.
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reasonable given all of the circumstances. The outcome of her case
could have differed dramatically had she been allowed to present her
theory of defense based on self-defense and battered woman syndrome.
This decision has limited self-defense in a way that may generate a
greater demand for 'defense of self' against limitations that allow selfdefense for more culpable acts while denying the same defense for a less
culpable act.
ANDREA L. EARHART
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